Consequentialism holds, roughly, that acts are permissible if and only if they bring about the best outcome. The right-to-left reading of this biconditional is a particularly compelling idea. Since by our acts we influence how things turn out, it's hard to deny that it is always permissible to actualize the outcome that's best. And yet critics have leveled a number of powerful objections. It is argued that the theory's commitment to aggregation is objectionable, that it fails to recognize the separateness of persons, that it disregards the moral importance of integrity, that it's overly stringent (or excessively permissive), and that it falters in the face of collective action problems. Beyond these external criticisms, the precise formulation of the theory presents a number of technical obstacles. This has given rise to major internal disputes among its advocates. Should we, for example, bring about the most actual good or aim for the most expected good? Are our obligations determined by the possible consequences of our acts or their actual consequences? This course will address the three issues just mention: Consequentialism's compellingness, and its purported internal and external problems. This course is suitable for those who want to investigate the nature of consequentialism in a philosophically rigorous manner. By the end of the course, you'll have a sense of the complexities involved in working out a consequentialist theory.
| AUs | 3.0 AUs |
| Grade Type | |
| Prerequisite | HY2002 |
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| Not Offered As BDE | Yes |
| Not Offered As Unrestricted Elective | |
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